This paper analyses political debates about civic integration policies in the Netherlands, so as to identify different conceptions of the role of the state in ensuring social cohesion by governing diversity. Drawing on the literature on party systems, it presents an analysis of political party positions on the role of the state in civic integration along two dimensions: economic distribution on the one hand, and socio-cultural governance on the other hand. We find that while the large majority of Dutch political parties adopt authoritarian positions on the socio-cultural axis in favour of state intervention to protect Dutch culture and identity, their positions diverge significantly on the classic economic Left-Right dimension. The most contentious issue in Dutch civic integration politics is whether the state, the market, or individual migrants should be responsible for financing and organising courses.
Introduction
The mushrooming of civic integration policies is one of the most remarkable trends in migration and integration policies in Europe today. While language and integration requirements have long been part of many European naturalization procedures, formalised civic integration programs made their appearance in Europe in the 1990s. In recent years, a growing number of EU countries have made entry and residence rights conditional on participation in or successful completion of civic integration courses (Goodman 2010 , Jacobs and Rea 2007 , Van Oers et al. 2010 .
Civic integration policies reflect the assumption that state intervention is necessary to safeguard the cohesion and regulate the diversity of contemporary European societies. Policymakers perceive the consequences of past and present immigration flows as a societal problem which the state is to solve. As Ines Michalowski (2009a, p. 23) rightly argues, civic integration policies reveal 'the competence that a state attributes itself in the management of cultural and religious diversity'.
Studying debates and policies of civic integration allows us to identify different conceptions of the role of the state in ensuring social cohesion by governing diversity.
Political parties are crucial actors in decision-making processes about citizenship policies.
However, party politics have been by and large neglected in citizenship studies so far. This paper analyses the positions adopted by political parties as to the role the state should play in civic integration policies, i.e. in regulating diversity. It does so by drawing on the literature on party systems, applying in particular political scientists' work on issue divides. As we shall see below, the analysis by Herbert Kitschelt (2004) of political preference distribution among political parties along two issue divides -economic distribution on the one hand, and socio-cultural governance on the other -offers important insights when applied to political debates about civic integration policies. This paper focuses on political debates in the Netherlands, which was the first European country to introduce civic integration policies in the 1990s. These policies have served as a model to policymakers throughout Europe. Moreover, in recent years the Netherlands has embarked upon reforms which redistributed the responsibility for civic integration among individual, state, and other 3 actors in more radical and innovative ways than any other European country. This paper analyses the political debates in which these reforms were shaped, i.e. the parliamentary history of the Law on Civic Integration (Wet Inburgering), which Dutch parliamentarians have been debating from 2002 until the present day. The data consists of 367 documents selected from the parliamentary records through keyword search, including government memoranda, legislative proposals, records of commission meetings and plenary debates, as well as parliamentary motions, questions and amendments. This data was analysed in two complementary ways. First, all statements by political parties about the role of the state in civic integration policies were scored, so as to identify their overall position in the two-dimensional space of Kitschelt's model. Second, a qualitative content analysis of debates was performed to sustain and refine our interpretation of the positions adopted by the different political parties, and to relate these positions to policy changes.
The next section provides an overview of the literature on the role of the state in civic integration policies and proposes an original perspective on this question drawing on the party systems literature. The second section sketches a short history of Dutch civic integration policies, while the third section presents the empirical analysis of political party positioning in debates on civic integration policies. The fourth concluding section highlights how a party politics approach can contribute to our understanding of citizenship policies in Europe.
I. The role of the state in civic integration policies: theoretical approaches
The proliferation of civic integration courses and tests for immigrants in Europe in the course of the last decade has attracted a great deal of academic attention. Many studies offer comparative analyses, exploring questions of convergence and divergence, explaining national specificities, or proposing modes of categorisation (Bonjour 2010 , Carrera 2006 , Goodman 2010 , Groenendijk 2011 , Jacobs and Rea 2007 , Joppke 2007a , Van Oers et al. 2010 -see also the PROSINT and INTEC projects 1 ) .
The particular question of the role of the state in civic integration policies has mainly been addressed from a normative perspective. There is a lively on-going debate in the literature as to 4 whether or not these new policies of integration and citizenship should be considered 'liberal' (Joppke 2007a , 2007b , Guild et al. 2009 , Michalowski 2011 , Joppke and Bauböck 2010 
II. A short history of Dutch civic integration policies
In the early 1990s, the Netherlands started to move away from the 'ethnic minorities policies' that had given rise to its reputation of a multicultural country. The government opted for an 'integration policy' that aimed primarily at individual socio-economic independence, rather than at emancipation of groups. Cultural matters were considered a private rather than a government concern. The neoliberal ideology of 'individual responsibility' that had started to shape the reforms of the Dutch welfare state since the mid-1980s was now also applied to the field of migrant incorporation, leading to a new emphasis on the duties that should accompany rights (Bonjour 2009 , p. 192-198, Entzinger 2003 , Scholten 2007 .
As part of this shift, the first civic integration policies for newcomers were introduced in 1996
and laid down in the Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers) of 7 1998. Immigrants -other than labour migrants -were obliged to participate in a Dutch language course as well as in societal and professional orientation programs. The municipalities contracted the semi-governmental Regional Education Centres (ROCs) to provide the courses, which were free of charge for the participants. Failure to participate was sanctioned with a fine. In parallel to this obligatory program for newcomers, a voluntary program was set up for so-called 'oldcomers'
(oudkomers), i.e. people of migrant origin who had been living in the Netherlands for some time (Commissie Blok 2004, p. 118-124) .
While it is important to note that the introduction of obligatory civic integration policies The new Law replaced the obligation to participate in the course by an obligation to pass the exam. Failure to pass the exam was sanctioned with a fine and with the denial of a permanent residence permit. Also, the target group of obligatory civic integration was expanded from newcomers to an estimated 250 thousand 'oldcomers'. All foreigners who were not educated in the Netherlands were obliged to pass the exam, regardless of their length of residence in the Netherlands. 8 Most importantly in the context of this paper, the Law on Civic Integration brought major changes to the role and responsibility attributed to the state in implementing civic integration policies.
The provision of courses was opened up to the 'free market': the monopoly of the semi-public
Regional Education Centres was abolished, so that any organisation or company was allowed to provide civic integration courses. In addition, 'personal responsibility' was to be a leading principle.
As a rule, individual participants were to decide for themselves how to prepare for the exam -e.g. in which institution to follow courses -and to pay for the courses themselves. Those who could not afford to do so could borrow money from the government. Part of the costs (70% with a maximum of 3000€) would be reimbursed if the exam was passed within three years. Thus, as a general rule, the role of the state would henceforth be limited to drafting and administering the exams, and providing certain financial facilities. Only for specific groups -unemployed, housewives 3 , religious ministers and newcomers admitted on asylum grounds -were municipalities allowed to select and finance the course program. Even these groups were to pay a contribution of 270€ to the costs of the course.
In the Lower House, there was broad and warm support for fundamental reform of civic integration policies. While there were concerns among the opposition about the costs and obligations imposed on migrants, all the 150 members of the Lower House eventually voted in favour of the government proposal, except for one member of the Liberal Democrat party. Democrats and the small reformed ChristenUnie, maintained the obligation for newcomers and oldcomers to pass the exam, as well as the principle of a free market for civic integration course providers. However, the Social-Democrat minister Ella Vogelaar, who replaced Rita Verdonk, significantly softened the interpretation of 'personal responsibility'. She gave municipalities the possibility to offer a civic integration provision for free to all participants. 6 Although in principle, municipalities could still oblige migrants to prepare for the exam through their own means, in practice municipalities went on to select and finance the civic integration program for almost everyone.
Between 2007 and 2009, more than 100 thousand newcomers and oldcomers embarked upon a civic 9 integration program provided by their municipality, while less than 8 thousand persons prepared for the exam on their own, making use of the loan and reimbursement facilities available to this effect. 7 Thus, the role of the municipality in implementing civic integration policies had been restored to its old state.
However, the current Conservative Rutte government, which is composed of Conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats with minority support from the populist anti-immigrant Freedom
Party and entered office in 2010, has presented a proposal to reform the Law on Civic Integration once again, so as to reinstate the principle that migrants are to select and finance civic integration courses themselves, with state assistance limited to providing loan facilities for those with insufficient financial resources. Although to different degrees, a very large majority among Dutch politicians support interventionist policies aimed at a shared identity, value system, and culture.
Duyvendak (2011) Democrats want civic integration to be organised and financed (primarily) by the state.
The following two parts of this section present the results of a complementary qualitative content analysis of political debates, aimed first at a more refined interpretation of the positions adopted by different political parties, and second at relating these positions to the policy reforms implemented by successive Dutch governments since 2002.
The first issue divide: economic distribution
Ever since Dutch political parties started debating the Law on Civic Integration in the early 2000s, the most contentious issue has been the role of the state in economic distribution, i.e. whether the state should intervene to protect and assist the (financially) weak in society. On the side of this issue divide which favours a 'small state' in matters of economic redistribution in civic integration policies, we find the Conservative Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the populist anti-immigrant Freedom Party. These parties' views are reflected in the policies of the Balkenende II and Rutte I governments.
Doing away with the semi-public monopoly on the provision of civic integration courses and opening the market was expected to enhance the diversity ant the quality of the courses and to lower the prices. As a Conservative Liberal MP argued: 'People are different and may have different demands. (…) If the market is good at anything, it is at making supply meet demand. (…) This will probably lower the costs too'. 9 The Christian Democrats took up a relatively moderate position, stating that the government should play a role in assuring that the courses met certain quality standards. This government involvement would not eliminate the responsibility of either business or individual 13 migrants however: the minister was to develop these standards 'together with business organisations' and migrants should retain the possibility to opt for an uncertified course provider: 'in the end, this is the candidate's own responsibility'.
10
'Individual responsibility' has been a mantra in Dutch migrant incorporation policies since the early 1990s. However, the Conservative Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Freedom Party have pushed for a more radical interpretation of this mantra, in which migrants would be expected to prepare for the civic integration exam on their own, with only limited financial state assistance. As
Minister Verdonk argued, 'personal responsibility yields the best results. It stimulates people to get busy themselves and to find the best way to prepare for the civic integration exam '. 11 No longer should migrants be treated as 'care categories that need to be taken by the hand by the government'. On the other side of this issue divide, we find the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Socialist Party, and the Liberal Democrats, who favour a 'big state' in matters of economic distribution in civic integration policies. The views of these parties are reflected in the policies of the Balkende IV government, in which the Christian Democrats participated but Social Democrat ministers were responsible for civic integration policies.
From the first debates on the Law on Civic Integration, the Social Democrats had criticized minister Verdonk's plans:
The responsibility of the government is marginalised in these proposals. The newcomer is left to find his way between legal obligation and market mechanisms. Individual responsibility is primary in our vision too, but as new citizens of our country they must also be enabled to participate.
18
In a similar vein, the Greens argued that 'the obligation to learn must be met by the right to education'. 19 The Liberal Democrats stated that 'considering the efforts that people make, [the state] has a duty to provide'. 20 Likewise, the Socialist Party argued that 'if you introduce an obligation, the migrant (…) at least has a right to a good and fitting [civic integration] provision'. 21 This criticism increased as the first results of the Law on Civic Integration proved severely disappointing, with the number of persons embarking on a civic integration course dropping from 30 thousand to 10 thousand in the first year after the Law entered into force.
22
In response, the Social Democrat minister Ella Vogelaar, responsible for civic integration policies in the fourth Balkenende government, decided that municipalities would once again be allowed to offer a course to any member of the target group, not just to the 'special' categories. In explaining why she chose to 'shift the responsibility for providing a course to municipalities', minister
Vogelaar wrote: 'the personal responsibility of applicants remains fully valid on a number of points, but what is at stake is finding the proper balance between this personal responsibility and the societal interest of having as many people as possible doing civic integration. In the Law on Civic Integration, this balance was insufficiently found'. 23 Thus, the role of the municipalities in the provision of civic integration courses was fully restored. No formal changes were made to the free market provision of 15 courses, but in practice the municipalities became almost the only buyer on the market. 24 The state may no longer have had a monopoly on the offer, but it had a virtual monopoly of the demand, thereby retrieving significant control over the market.
If these politicians favoured a bigger role for the state, it was because they considered the target group of civic integration a vulnerable group. Minister Vogelaar wrote:
If the government gives the impression that it will take care of everything, citizens will not feel called upon to do much themselves. On the other hand, if the government leaves everything to citizens, it is likely that only those with the necessary competences will manage to get things well organized.
25
In other words, this government thought only a very specific part of the target group fitted the profile of able and autonomous citizens that underlay the original Law on Civic Integration. For the rest of the target group, state provisions were deemed necessary. The Social Democrats stated that 'responsibility must be placed where it can factually be carried; this involves capacities and financial resources', arguing that they knew 'from experience that these target groups in particular need some guidance to be able to carry this responsibility'. 26 Similarly, the Socialists claimed that 'the target group of this law is one that needs good guidance to be able to carry personal responsibility'. 27 Thus, these politicians wanted the state to provide and care for weaker groups in society, so as to redistribute economic resources in society more evenly.
It is this opposition between the preferences of Christian Democrats, Conservative Liberals, Integration does not imply that one join some kind of majority culture. Especially in our country, there is so much cultural plurality -also within and between groups of native citizens -that one can hardly speak of a majority culture. (…) Cultural uniformity fits better with a dictatorship.
33
Reconciling these two contradictory views is a constant and enduring struggle for the Dutch Christian
Democrats. Overall however, the authoritarian view has clearly dominated Christian Democratic discourse over the last decade.
17
The preference of the Conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats for a thick moral identity disseminated through state policies is reflected in the positions adopted by the Balkenende II and Rutte governments. Conservative Liberal Minister Verdonk argued that 'sharing dominant norms and fundamental values is vital for participation' in Dutch society. 34 The terms of the exam on Knowledge of Dutch Society which Verdonk introduced in 2006 include the requirement that the migrant understand that 'Dutch people can be very direct, without intending to be offensive or impolite' and therefore 'do not take direct feedback and criticism personally'. The successful candidate would also make appointments before visiting acquaintances, know when to draw a number in a shop, and warn the neighbours before organising a party. 35 The current Thus, the Social Democrats have come to share the same authoritarian position on the socio-cultural axis as the Christian Democrats.
The views expressed by the centre-Left Balkenende IV government reflect the more moderate authoritarian position of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, as well as the internal tensions which characterise the discourses of both these parties. On the one hand, the government 'realises that it is not always possible or necessary to agree on all differences in conduct and opinions. Thus, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats are the only Dutch political parties to favour a small state in matters of identity, moral values and social conduct.
IV. Political party preferences on governing diversity: two lines of conflict
The two-dimensional model proposed by Herbert Kitschelt is an incisive tool to analyse political debates about governing diversity. It enables us to show that the large majority of Dutch political parties position themselves on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural governance axis, favouring Kitschelt's preference distribution model offers an innovative, comprehensive way of understanding political dynamics in the field of citizenship and migrant incorporation. It is a dynamic model, in that it offers insight into interactions between political actors as well as policy change.
Moreover, it broadens our analytical perspective on the politics of citizenship. It enables us to comprehend how citizenship policies are shaped not only by views on the relation between identity,
